DARWIN'S GOD (PART 4)
By ROBIN MARANTZ HENIG
with their own beliefs, desires and intentions. Psychologists call these tools,
respectively, with their own beliefs, desires and intentions. Psychologists call these
tools, respectively, agent detection, causal reasoning and theory of mind.
agent detection, causal reasoning and theory of mind.
Agent detection evolved because assuming the presence of an agent — which is
jargon for any creature with volitional, independent behavior — is more adaptive than
assuming its absence. If you are a caveman on the savannah, you are better off
presuming that the motion you detect out of the corner of your eye is an agent and
something to run from, even if you are wrong. If it turns out to have been just the
rustling of leaves, you are still alive; if what you took to be leaves rustling was really a
hyena about to pounce, you are dead.
A classic experiment from the 1940s by the psychologists Fritz Heider and Marianne
Simmel suggested that imputing agency is so automatic that people may do it even
for geometric shapes. For the experiment, subjects watched a film of triangles and
circles moving around. When asked what they had been watching, the subjects used
words like “chase” and “capture.” They did not just see the random movement of
shapes on a screen; they saw pursuit, planning, escape.
So if there is motion just out of our line of sight, we presume it is caused by an agent,
an animal or person with the ability to move independently. This usually operates in
one direction only; lots of people mistake a rock for a bear, but almost no one
mistakes a bear for a rock.
What does this mean for belief in the supernatural? It means our brains are primed
for it, ready to presume the presence of agents even when such presence confounds
logic. “The most central concepts in religions are related to agents,” Justin Barrett, a
psychologist, wrote in his 2004 summary of the byproduct theory, “Why Would Anyone
Believe in God?” Religious agents are often supernatural, he wrote, “people with
superpowers, statues that can answer requests or disembodied minds that can act
on us and the world.”
A second mental module that primes us for religion is causal reasoning. The human
brain has evolved the capacity to impose a narrative, complete with chronology and
cause-and-effect logic, on whatever it encounters, no matter how apparently random.
“We automatically, and often unconsciously, look for an explanation of why things
happen to us,” Barrett wrote, “and ‘stuff just happens’ is no explanation. Gods, by
virtue of their strange physical properties and their mysterious superpowers, make
fine candidates for causes of many of these unusual events.” The ancient Greeks
believed thunder was the sound of Zeus’s thunderbolt. Similarly, a contemporary
woman whose cancer treatment works despite 10-to-1 odds might look for a story to
explain her survival. It fits better with her causal-reasoning tool for her recovery to be a
miracle, or a reward for prayer, than for it to be just a lucky roll of the dice.
A third cognitive trick is a kind of social intuition known as theory of mind. It’s an odd
phrase for something so automatic, since the word “theory” suggests formality and
self-consciousness. Other terms have been used for the same concept, like
intentional stance and social cognition. One good alternative is the term Atran uses:
folkpsychology.
Folkpsychology, as Atran and his colleagues see it, is essential to getting along in
the contemporary world, just as it has been since prehistoric times. It allows us to
anticipate the actions of others and to lead others to believe what we want them to
believe; it is at the heart of everything from marriage to office politics to poker. People
without this trait, like those with severe autism, are impaired, unable to imagine
themselves in other people’s heads.
The process begins with positing the existence of minds, our own and others’, that
we cannot see or feel. This leaves us open, almost instinctively, to belief in the
separation of the body (the visible) and the mind (the invisible). If you can posit minds
in other people that you cannot verify empirically, suggests Paul Bloom, a
psychologist and the author of “Descartes’ Baby,” published in 2004, it is a short step
to positing minds that do not have to be anchored to a body. And from there, he said,
it is another short step to positing an immaterial soul and a transcendent God.
By ROBIN MARANTZ HENIG
with their own beliefs, desires and intentions. Psychologists call these tools,
respectively, with their own beliefs, desires and intentions. Psychologists call these
tools, respectively, agent detection, causal reasoning and theory of mind.
agent detection, causal reasoning and theory of mind.
Agent detection evolved because assuming the presence of an agent — which is
jargon for any creature with volitional, independent behavior — is more adaptive than
assuming its absence. If you are a caveman on the savannah, you are better off
presuming that the motion you detect out of the corner of your eye is an agent and
something to run from, even if you are wrong. If it turns out to have been just the
rustling of leaves, you are still alive; if what you took to be leaves rustling was really a
hyena about to pounce, you are dead.
A classic experiment from the 1940s by the psychologists Fritz Heider and Marianne
Simmel suggested that imputing agency is so automatic that people may do it even
for geometric shapes. For the experiment, subjects watched a film of triangles and
circles moving around. When asked what they had been watching, the subjects used
words like “chase” and “capture.” They did not just see the random movement of
shapes on a screen; they saw pursuit, planning, escape.
So if there is motion just out of our line of sight, we presume it is caused by an agent,
an animal or person with the ability to move independently. This usually operates in
one direction only; lots of people mistake a rock for a bear, but almost no one
mistakes a bear for a rock.
What does this mean for belief in the supernatural? It means our brains are primed
for it, ready to presume the presence of agents even when such presence confounds
logic. “The most central concepts in religions are related to agents,” Justin Barrett, a
psychologist, wrote in his 2004 summary of the byproduct theory, “Why Would Anyone
Believe in God?” Religious agents are often supernatural, he wrote, “people with
superpowers, statues that can answer requests or disembodied minds that can act
on us and the world.”
A second mental module that primes us for religion is causal reasoning. The human
brain has evolved the capacity to impose a narrative, complete with chronology and
cause-and-effect logic, on whatever it encounters, no matter how apparently random.
“We automatically, and often unconsciously, look for an explanation of why things
happen to us,” Barrett wrote, “and ‘stuff just happens’ is no explanation. Gods, by
virtue of their strange physical properties and their mysterious superpowers, make
fine candidates for causes of many of these unusual events.” The ancient Greeks
believed thunder was the sound of Zeus’s thunderbolt. Similarly, a contemporary
woman whose cancer treatment works despite 10-to-1 odds might look for a story to
explain her survival. It fits better with her causal-reasoning tool for her recovery to be a
miracle, or a reward for prayer, than for it to be just a lucky roll of the dice.
A third cognitive trick is a kind of social intuition known as theory of mind. It’s an odd
phrase for something so automatic, since the word “theory” suggests formality and
self-consciousness. Other terms have been used for the same concept, like
intentional stance and social cognition. One good alternative is the term Atran uses:
folkpsychology.
Folkpsychology, as Atran and his colleagues see it, is essential to getting along in
the contemporary world, just as it has been since prehistoric times. It allows us to
anticipate the actions of others and to lead others to believe what we want them to
believe; it is at the heart of everything from marriage to office politics to poker. People
without this trait, like those with severe autism, are impaired, unable to imagine
themselves in other people’s heads.
The process begins with positing the existence of minds, our own and others’, that
we cannot see or feel. This leaves us open, almost instinctively, to belief in the
separation of the body (the visible) and the mind (the invisible). If you can posit minds
in other people that you cannot verify empirically, suggests Paul Bloom, a
psychologist and the author of “Descartes’ Baby,” published in 2004, it is a short step
to positing minds that do not have to be anchored to a body. And from there, he said,
it is another short step to positing an immaterial soul and a transcendent God.
Minorities Interests
Knowledge, Culture, Social
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Knowledge, Culture, Social
Meet And Share
